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Abstract 
Under what conditions do elections lead to democratization or conversely, sustain 
authoritarianism? State capacity may be a crucial intervening variable affecting the democratizing 
power of elections in authoritarian regimes. In regimes with limited state capacity, manipulating 
elections, co-opting elites, and repressing opposition is more difficult than in regimes with more 
extensive state capacity, rendering turnover in elections more likely in weak states. Yet, while 
increasing the chances of turnover, if the new incumbent has limited capacity to deliver public 
services and make policy changes after coming to power, democratic change is unlikely to be 
sustainable. Hence, state capacity may be a double-edged sword. This paper tests these 
expectations using Varieties of Democracy data for 460 elections in 110 authoritarian regimes 
from 1974 to 2012, and finds that state capacity is negatively associated with incumbent turnover 
but positively associated with democratic change after incumbent turnover in electoral 
authoritarian regimes. 
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Introduction 
As many autocracies in the world today hold multiparty elections (van Ham and Lindberg, 2015), 
the question under what conditions elections contribute to democratization is increasingly 
important. The democratization-by-elections literature argues that repeated elections, even when 
held in authoritarian contexts, eventually lead to democratization (Lindberg, 2006, 2009; Howard 
and Roessler, 2006; Brownlee, 2009; Edgell et al., 2015). Yet, research on electoral 
authoritarianism has demonstrated that elections in authoritarian regimes are often subverted to 
such an extent that they strengthen, rather than weaken, authoritarian rule (Gandhi and Lust-
Okar, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002, 2013). As electoral authoritarian regimes 
such as Malaysia, Russia, and Cameroon demonstrate (see other contributions to this special 
issue), the democratizing power of elections is not universal, and hence better understanding the 
conditions under which elections have democratizing consequences is important.  
State capacity may be one of the conditions affecting the democratizing power of 
elections in authoritarian regimes. Some scholars have argued that developing strong state 
institutions is an important pre-condition for successful democratization, both by preventing 
instability and conflict in transitional regimes as well as by enabling newly democratic 
governments to gain legitimacy by providing public services to citizens (Carothers, 2007; 
Fukuyama, 2014; Mansfield and Snyder, 2007; Fortin, 2012; Mazucca and Munck, 2014). Yet, 
state capacity may serve those same functions in autocratic regimes, and in addition help further 
sustain authoritarianism by strengthening autocrats’ capacity to fabricate support and oppress 
dissent (Schedler, 2013; Seeberg, 2014; Way, 2005; Slater, 2012), suggesting state capacity might 
be equally important for both democratic and autocratic stability (Anderson et al., 2014; Slater, 
2012; Slater and Fenner, 2011).  
This article develops a framework that seeks to disentangle the causal connections 
between state capacity, elections and democratization in the context of electoral authoritarian 
regimes. We argue that the mechanism of “democratization-by-elections” needs to be unpacked 
to consider the consequences of elections for incumbent turnover and post-election democratic 
change separately. Moreover, the effects of state capacity on turnover and post-election 
democratic change may not be mutually reinforcing: while state capacity is likely to have a 
negative effect on incumbent turnover, it is likely to have a positive effect on post-election 
democratic change. In authoritarian regimes with weak state capacity, manipulating elections, 
repressing opposition, and co-opting ruling elites may be more difficult to achieve than in 
authoritarian regimes with strong state capacity. Hence we might expect elections in weak states 
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to be more likely to lead to incumbent turnover. Yet, while increasing the chances of turnover, if 
the new incumbent has limited capacity to deliver public services and make policy changes after 
coming to power, democratic change is unlikely to be sustainable. This leaves us in a bit of a 
bind: authoritarian regimes with strong state capacity are less likely to experience incumbent 
turnover that could open possibilities for broader democratic change, while authoritarian regimes 
with weak state capacity are more likely to experience incumbent turnover, but may not be able 
to sustain democracy once turnover took place.1 Hence, in authoritarian regimes, state capacity 
might be a double-edged sword that can both reinforce as well as undermine the democratizing 
power of elections. 
In the next section we further develop this theoretical argument and propose five 
hypotheses to test empirically how state capacity conditions the democratizing power of 
elections. We then present our data and methods and subsequently proceed to test the 
hypotheses on a sample of 460 elections in 110 electoral authoritarian regimes from 1974 to 
2012 using new data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (version 6.1). We find 
evidence of the expected relationship: state capacity is negatively associated with incumbent 
turnover but positively associated with democratic change after incumbent turnover in electoral 
authoritarian regimes. The paper concludes with a reflection on the results and suggestions for 
future research.  
 
I. State Capacity, Elections and Democratic Change 
in Authoritarian Regimes 
In order to understand whether elections can have democratizing consequences in authoritarian 
regimes, and the extent to which this is conditional on their state capacity, we need to 
disentangle the causal connections between state capacity, elections and democratic change.2  
Figure 1 illustrates these relationships. In order to clarify our argument it is important to 
distinguish: (i) how elections influence democratic change (arrow a); (ii) how state capacity 																																																								
1 Note that, as we elaborate upon below, incumbent turnover in elections does not guarantee broader democratic 
change (as elections may bring new autocrats to power), but it does create possibilities for democratic change if the 
new incumbent(s) is/are democrats.   
2 Note that we refer to democratic change throughout the paper rather than democratization, as democratic change 
allows us to conceive of authoritarian regimes shifting towards democracy (i.e. if we conceive of regimes as varying 
on a continuum from very authoritarian to very democratic) without necessarily fully democratizing (i.e. passing a 
threshold on this continuum that shifts a regime from electoral authoritarianism into electoral democracy), and also 
allows us to record smaller shifts towards democracy. The core idea of the democratization-by-elections thesis is 
that elections can move regimes, even autocratic ones, into a more democratic direction by generating 
improvements in partial regimes other than elections, such as civil liberties, media freedom, rule of law, etc., and 
hence the concept of democratic change captures this effect of elections well.  
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influences democratic change (arrow b); and (iii) how state capacity might condition the relation 
between elections and democratic change (arrow c). Note that state capacity can affect prospects 
for democratic change directly (b) as well as condition the effect of elections on democratic 
change (c). Hence disentangling these causal links is important for understanding and empirically 
testing the interrelationship between these three concepts.  
 
Figure 1: State Capacity, Elections, and Democratic Change 
 
 
Elections and Democratic Change  
Elections can affect democratic change in two ways. First of all, elections can generate 
democratic change by strengthening other partial regimes of democracy, as proposed by 
Lindberg (2006, 2009). The original democratization-by-elections thesis argued that repeated 
experiences with elections led to learning and socialization of elites and citizens into the practices 
of democracy, as well as creating moments of temporary widening of media freedom and 
enlarged civil liberties, changes that might be difficult to turn back after the elections are over 
(Lindberg 2006, 2009). Elections may thus generate changes in other partial regimes of 
democracy, and as a consequence improve the quality of the overall regime.3  
Yet, elections can also affect democratization by generating incumbent turnover in 
elections, creating a possibility for citizens to ‘throw the rascals out’ if they are dissatisfied with 
the incumbent government (Huntington, 1991: 174). Of course, in electoral authoritarian 
regimes this possibility may be very small, but even autocrats sometimes lose elections, creating a 
window of opportunity for political change (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). Yet, even 																																																								
3 However, the empirical evidence on democratization-by-elections is mixed. A recent study on a global sample of 
elections that analyzes regional and period differences, suggests that democratization-by-elections occurred mainly 
in the third wave, and mainly in Africa and post-communist Europe, finding weaker or no effects in other regions 
and time periods (Edgell et al, 2015). 
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if autocrats lose elections, new incumbents may not necessarily be democrats, and hence 
turnover in elections may also lead to a new authoritarian regime being established. Hence, 
evaluating whether elections have democratizing effects requires a two-phase operationalization 
of democratization-by-elections: one that models the determinants of incumbent turnover 
separately from the determinants of democratic change after elections.  
To test whether elections have an effect on democratic change (causal arrow a in Figure 
1), we should compare democratic change in years after elections to democratic change in years 
when no elections occurred.4 Hence our first hypothesis is:  
 
H1 – Democratic change is higher after election years than after years when no elections occurred. 
 
As we expect the likelihood of democratic change to be higher after elections that resulted in 
turnover, our second hypothesis is:  
 
H2 – The positive association of elections with democratic change is stronger if elections resulted in 
incumbent turnover. 
 
State Capacity and Democratic Change 
The state, and state capacity, have been conceptualised in many different ways.5 Following the 
Weberian tradition, we define the state as “an entity that successfully claims a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force within a specified territory” (Weber, 1918). State capacity is defined as ”the 
ability of state institutions to effectively implement official goals” (Sikkink, 1991). Following 
Hanson (in this special issue; Hanson and Sigman, 2013), we distinguish three types of state 
capacity: coercive capacity, administrative capacity and extractive capacity. While coercive 
capacity relates to states’ capacity to maintain their monopoly of power and deliver a minimum 
level of security for citizens (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007; Fukuyama, 2004), administrative 
capacity refers to the capacity of states to implement policies and deliver basic public services 
(Anderson et al., 2014).6 Extractive capacity refers to the state’s capacity to generate resources, 																																																								
4 Note that in electoral authoritarian regimes, regime change can be triggered by elections, but also by other factors, 
such as coup d’etats, civil conflict, revolutions or transitions ‘from above’ initiated by incumbent regime elites. As 
regime change by elections appears to have become increasingly frequent in recent decades (Hellmann and 
Croissant), we focus on the role of elections in this paper. We include coup d’etats and civil wars in our empirical 
analyses as control variables.  
5  See Hanson in this special issue and Anderson, Moeller and Skaaning 2014 for reviews of different 
conceptualisations.  
6 Note that administrative capacity refers purely to the ability of states to “plan and execute policies” (Fukuyama, 
2004), not to whether those policies were executed in an impartial or fair manner. Hence, this definition of state 
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and hence extractive capacity is important for sustaining both coercive and administrative 
capacity. All three elements of state capacity may affect both the likelihood of democratic change 
directly (arrow b) as well as condition the democratizing power of elections (arrow c), hence for 
the sake of parsimony we conceive of state capacity as a single latent concept here. As Slater and 
Fenner (2011: 19) argue, a state has a variable amount of state capacity, which “regime actors can 
deploy through a set of mechanisms to achieve the particular political objective of authoritarian 
durability”. State capacity helps authoritarian incumbents to achieve such durability by (a) 
generating genuine support, (b) fabricating support and (c) oppressing dissent. Generating 
genuine support can be achieved by delivery of public services and political order (Slater, 2012; 
Slater and Fenner, 2011), while fabricating support and oppressing dissent can be achieved by –
for example- manipulating elections, co-opting citizens and elites, and coercing the opposition 
(Seeberg, 2014; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Schedler, 2013). Hence, state capacity helps 
authoritarian incumbents to address both horizontal and vertical threats, through the use of a 
variety of actions aimed at a variety of actors.7  
This means that authoritarian incumbents can use state capacity to prevent democratic 
change and stabilize their power. Note that as arrow b in Figure 1 shows, this can affect prospects 
for democratic change directly, regardless of whether elections are held or not. Co-optation of 
ruling elites and citizens can ensure loyalty and support for incumbents in the period between 
elections and lower the risk of coups, protests, and even revolutions or civil war; while coercion 
aimed at opposition serves the same purpose of maintaining stability of the regime, regardless of 
whether elections are being held (see also the case studies by Hellmann and Mietzner in this 
special issue). Hence, we would expect state capacity in authoritarian regimes to have a negative 
direct effect on democratic change, lowering the prospects of democratic change, as expressed in 
our third hypothesis. 
 
H3 – State capacity is negatively associated with democratic change in electoral authoritarian regimes  
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																																												
capacity excludes notions of impartiality and the rule of law as this would generate conceptual overlap between state 
capacity and democracy (Mazucca and Munck, 2014).  
7 Note that the range of options available to incumbents is not only determined by the capacity of state institutions 
as defined here, but also by “the extent to which these institutions can be controlled by the dictator” (Hanson). In 
the remainder of this paper, we do not further consider variation in regime control over the state, due to limitations 
in cross-national data, but this topic is covered in other articles in this special issue (see Hellmann’s chapter on 
South Korea and the case study on Russia by White) 
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How State Capacity Conditions the Democratizing Power of 
Elections 
To understand how state capacity affects the democratizing power of elections (arrow c in Figure 
1), the two-phase operationalization of democratization-by-elections separating incumbent 
turnover from democratic change after elections is important. In elections, strong state capacity 
can enable incumbents to engage in all the tactics to hold on to power described above. For 
example, strong state capacity allows incumbents to ramp up delivery of public services and 
goods in the months leading up to the elections, to target clientelism to supporting citizens, to 
co-opt elites by promises of access to and redistribution of state resources after the elections, to 
intimidate opposition and voters and oppress independent sources of information, to manipulate 
electoral institutions such as electoral management bodies to deliver results in favour of the 
incumbent, etc. (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Schedler, 2013; Seeberg, 2014). Hence, we would 
expect strong state capacity to significantly lower the chances of turnover in authoritarian 
elections, and elections held in electoral authoritarian regimes with strong states as Malaysia, 
Singapore and Russia are good examples of this logic (Slater, 2012; Seeberg, 2014). Conversely, 
we would expect weak state capacity to increase the likelihood of turnover in authoritarian 
elections, as illustrated by elections in Haiti, Bangladesh and Comoros.  
However, while lacking state capacity may increase the probability that elections trigger 
incumbent turnover, subsequent democratic change may be less likely in regimes with limited 
state capacity, as the literature on democratization suggests. Hence, what may be needed for 
democratic change after elections to be successful is the (unlikely) combination of strong states 
and incumbent turnover in elections. While incumbent turnover is not a guarantee for 
democratic change, as an autocrat leader may be replaced by a new leader who is equally 
autocratic, it at least creates a possibility for a democratic incumbent to come to power and for 
post-election democratic change to take place. Hence, since the consequences of state capacity 
depend on which actors are in power and what political objectives they seek to achieve (Slater 
and Fenner, 2011), if elections in authoritarian regimes bring a ‘democrat’ to power, however 
unlikely, strong state capacity might well be important in supporting new incumbents’ attempts 
at further democratic change. Therefore, we would expect state capacity only to be positively 
associated with democratic change after elections if elections resulted in incumbent turnover. 
Our hypotheses for the conditional effect of state capacity on the democratizing power of 
elections are therefore:  
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H4 - Greater state capacity is associated with a lower likelihood of turnover in elections 
H5 - Greater state capacity is associated with greater democratic change after elections, conditional on 
turnover in elections 
 
II. Data and Methods 
The hypotheses outlined in the previous section are tested with new data from the Varieties of 
Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, version 6.1 (Coppedge et al., 2016a,b,c) and the Quality of 
Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2015), as well as data on state capacity from Hanson and 
Sigman (2013).  
 
Sample Selection 
As the theoretical argument focuses on authoritarian elections, the sample is limited to electoral 
authoritarian regimes. Since the boundaries between electoral authoritarian regimes and electoral 
democracies are somewhat fuzzy, and many different regime classifications exist (Diamond, 
2002; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002, 2013; Howard and Roessler, 2006), we prefer to 
err on the inclusive side and take as our cut-off point for electoral authoritarian regimes when 
regimes score below 0.5 on the V-Dem liberal democracy index, which runs from 0 to 1 ranging 
from the most authoritarian to the most democratic regimes. This means some ambiguous cases 
on the borderline between electoral authoritarianism and electoral democracy might be included, 
but the advantage is that we can be certain to have included all electoral authoritarian regimes. In 
addition, we test the robustness of our findings on a sample following Schedler’s (2002) selection 
criterion for electoral authoritarian regimes that defines regimes as electoral authoritarian when 
their average Freedom House political rights and civil liberties score is between 4 and 7; as well 
as a sample of regimes with Polity IV scores below 0. The results remain substantively similar, 
and are presented in the Appendix to this paper. In addition to these selection criteria, we also 
exclude closed autocracies that did not hold multiparty elections for the national executive and 
exclude countries that were not fully independent.8 In addition to limiting the sample to electoral 
authoritarian regimes, we further restrict the sample to national-level elections for the executive. 
Hence, in presidential regimes we include presidential elections and in parliamentary regimes we 
																																																								
8 Note that we also exclude autocracies that held single party elections.  
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include parliamentary elections.9 These choices leave a sample of 460 executive elections that 
took place between 1974 and 2012 in 110 countries around the world, spanning a total of 3116 
country-years.10  
 
Dependent Variables 
The analyses include two dependent variables: democratic change after elections and incumbent 
turnover in elections. We measure democratic change by calculating the change in the regime’s 
democracy score in the two years after the elections.11 The democracy score used is the liberal 
democracy index available in the V-Dem dataset.12 The liberal democracy index varies between 0 
and 1, ranging from very authoritarian to very democratic. Democratic change in the 2 and 3 
years after the elections varies substantially in our sample: from -0.37 to 0.65 and -0.37 to 0.70, 
respectively. In all the models with democratic change as the dependent variable, we include 
lagged democracy level (t-1) as an independent variable to control for ceiling effects.13  
Turnover as a result of national elections is measured using the V-Dem variables 
“turnover of the head of government and turnover of the head of state”. The scores vary 
between 1 (no turnover), 1 (half turnover) and 2 (wholesale turnover).14 To use a conservative 
measure of incumbent turnover, this variable was recoded to a dichotomous variable that takes a 
value of one only when there is wholesale turnover. In our sample, 34% of elections resulted in 
wholesale turnover.15 Tables A and B in the Appendix shows summary statistics for all variables.   
 
 																																																								
9 Robustness checks using a sample including all national-level parliamentary and presidential elections (i.e. also 
including parliamentary elections in presidential regimes) result in substantively similar findings. Results for these 
models can also be found in the Appendix.  
10 We include elections as of 1974, as this is when the third wave of democratization started and multiparty elections 
in authoritarian regimes became more common (Huntington 1991, Schedler 2002). Replication data and syntax are 
available on the authors’ website: insert website.  
11 We test the robustness of results using democratic change in the three years after the elections (reported in the 
Appendix), but don’t investigate longer time periods as this may lead to the inclusion of the next elections in the 
measure of democratic change, thus confounding cause and effect in the estimates. 
12 We test the robustness of our models to using V-Dem’s polyarchy index as well. Results are substantively similar 
and are reported in the Appendix.  
13 This is important because the scope for democratic change may be smaller in regimes that are more democratic 
already. In fact, the correlation between democratic change after elections and the level of democracy in the year 
before elections is -0.23, suggesting that indeed a ceiling effect exists.  
14 The exact question wording and answer categories of all V-Dem variables can be found in the V-Dem codebook 
(Coppedge et al. 2016b). Robustness checks were carried out using only turnover of the head of government, and 
results are substantively the same (see Appendix for models reporting robustness checks). Note that in this coding 
“turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems. Turnover 
does not only refer to the individual person holding office but also to that person’s party.” 
15 This is 28% if we only measure turnover as turnover of the head of government. See the appendix for results 
using turnover of the head of government.  
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Independent Variables 
Our main independent variable of interest is state capacity. We use the comprehensive measure 
of state capacity developed by Hanson and Sigman (2013), and test the robustness of our results 
with an alternative measure of state capacity from the Varieties of Democracy dataset.16 In the 
models explaining turnover, state capacity is lagged so it is measured in the year before the 
election, in the models explaining democratic change in the years after elections we measure state 
capacity in the year of the election.  
 
Controls 
In models explaining democratic change, we include control variables that have commonly been 
found to be associated with democratization in previous research (Hadenius 1992; Lindberg, 
2006; Przeworski et al., 2000; Teorell, 2010). We include control variables for economic 
development (GDP per capita and economic growth), based on data from the World 
Development Indicators,17 and dummy variables indicating whether a coup d’etat or civil war 
occurred in the year before the elections, based on data from the V-Dem dataset. We also 
include ethnic and religious fractionalization, whether the country has a presidential or 
parliamentary form of government, and the colonial origin of the country – whether it is a 
former British colony or not (Hadenius, 1992).18 We do not include the level of foreign aid and 
the level of natural resources as % of GDP as controls when predicting democratic change, as 
we anticipate these to be intervening variables in the relationship between state capacity and 
democratic change. We lag all control variables with one year, so they are measured in the year 
before the elections took place.  
In models explaining turnover, we include several control variables considered to drive 
turnover in elections. As turnover is more likely if economic performance is unsatisfactory 
(Sanchez Cuenca and Maravall, 2008), we include GDP per capita and economic growth. Clarity 
of responsibility is required for voters to hold incumbents accountable for bad performance 
(Powell and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2007), and clarity of responsibility is considered to be 
																																																								
16 We use the V-dem variable “state authority over territory”, measured as “over what percentage (%) of the 
territory does the state have effective control?” as a proxy for state capacity.  
17 Downloaded 22 February 2016 from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ 
18 Note that in the fixed effects models predicting democratic change these variables did not have to be included as 
they are time invariant variables and hence fixed effects already controls for these potential confounders. These 
control variables were however included in the treatment models.  
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higher in presidential (vs. parliamentary) systems (Samuels, 2004), hence we include 
presidentialism as a control variable too.19  
 
Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy is built up in two steps. First, in order to test the direct effects of elections 
and state capacity on democratic change (H1 - H3), the first analyses predict democratic change 
in all country-years, and compare democratic change in years after elections to democratic 
change after years in which no elections occurred. These analyses are carried out using time-
series cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression with country fixed effects, and results are 
presented in Table 1 in the next section.  
Subsequently, to test the conditional effect of state capacity on turnover in elections and 
democratic change (H4-H5), we first test the effect of state capacity on turnover and democratic 
change separately, using time-series cross-sectional logistic regression with regional fixed effects 
for turnover models, and time-series cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression with 
country fixed effects for democratic change models.20 Then, in order to model turnover and 
democratic change simultaneously as part of a two-step equation, I use a treatment effect model 
to test first, how state capacity affects turnover (selection model) and subsequently how state 
capacity affects democratic change once turnover has taken place (regression equation).21 Since 
these analyses zoom in on the consequences of elections, the sample is limited to election years. 
Results for these analyses are presented in Table 2 in the next section. Robustness checks of the 
analyses are reported in the Appendix.  
 
III. Results 
Table 1 shows the results of the analyses testing the causal relationships illustrated in Figure 1, 
comparing democratic change in years after elections to democratic change after years when no 
elections occurred. Models 1 and 2 demonstrate that even in authoritarian regimes, holding 
elections leads to positive democratic change. The negative coefficient for the lagged level of 																																																								
19 Turnover in elections is also likely to be affected by the availability of viable opposition candidates (Anderson, 
2007). Finally, the level of electoral fraud can affect the likelihood of turnover. However, we do not ultimately 
control for the availability of viable opposition and the level of electoral fraud as both of these variables likely lie on 
the causal pathway from state capacity to turnover. In other words, it is through election fraud and supressing 
opposition, among other methods, that authoritarian regimes use state capacity to reduce the likelihood of turnover. 
20 A Hausman test indicates random effects are appropriate for the turnover models, while fixed effects are needed 
for the democratic change models. 
21 We use a treatment effect model rather than a Hausman selection model since we have outcome data for both 
treated and non-treated groups (i.e. elections with and without turnover) (Shenyang and Fraser 2015).  
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democracy (the V-Dem liberal democracy index variable) also indicates that the rate of change 
declines as regimes become more democratic, i.e. there is a ceiling effect. The interaction effect 
between whether elections were held and lagged level of democracy also indicates that the 
impact of elections on democratic change is largest in the most authoritarian regimes. Hence, 
holding elections has democratizing effects even in the most authoritarian regimes, even if this 
effect is substantively small, confirming hypothesis 1. Turning to models 3 and 4, when elections 
resulted in turnover, their effect on democratic change is stronger, which is in line with 
hypothesis 2. However, this effect is not significant.  
Turning to the effect of state capacity on democratic change, as models 5 and 6 show, in 
our sample of electoral authoritarian regimes state capacity indeed negatively affects democratic 
change, confirming hypothesis 3. This effect is robust to inclusion of controls and the inclusion 
of the election variables, as reported in the combined models 7 and 8. The effect of holding 
elections is also unchanged when state capacity is included in the combined models, and 
turnover is one-tailed significant in the model with control variables.  
Model 7 and 8 also show results for an interaction effect between state capacity and 
holding elections, to test the conditional effect of state capacity on the democratizing power of 
elections. The effect in model 7 is small, but positive and significant. This indicates that state 
capacity has a negative direct effect on democratic change, but the impact of elections on 
democratic change is strengthened in contexts of high state capacity. If state capacity has 
opposing effects on turnover in elections and democratic change as we expect, this may muddle 
our findings, and hence we need to model the effect of state capacity on both turnover in 
elections and democratic change after elections. Table 2 therefore models the impact of state 
capacity on democratization-by-elections as a two-phase process.  
We first predict the effect of state capacity on turnover directly in models 1 and 2, and 
then predict the effect of state capacity on democratic change after elections that did not result 
in turnover and elections that did result in turnover, modeled by an interaction effect between 
state capacity and turnover (model 3 and 4). Model 5 reports the results when both are modeled 
simultaneously in a treatment effect model, where turnover is the dependent variable of the 
selection equation and democratic change is the dependent variable of the regression equation.
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Table 1: The Effect of Elections and State Capacity on Democratic Change 
 Models Testing H1 Models Testing H2 Models Testing H3 Combined Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Democratic Change 
Democratic 
Change 
Democratic 
Change 
Democratic 
Change 
Democratic 
Change 
Democratic 
Change 
Democratic 
Change 
Democratic 
Change` 
         
Executive election held? 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.036***   0.043*** 0.039*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)      (0.008) (0.008)    
Level of democracy (t-1) -0.147*** -0.188*** -0.146*** -0.187*** -0.162*** -0.208*** -0.147*** -0.190*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)    (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)    
Election x Democracy -0.119*** -0.110*** -0.121*** -0.113***   -0.118*** -0.115*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)      (0.027) (0.028)    
Turnover in election?   0.009 0.009   0.012 0.012+ 
   (0.007) (0.007)      (0.007) (0.007)    
State Capacity     -0.011** -0.012** -0.011** -0.012**  
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
State Capacity x Election       0.014** 0.011*   
       (0.005) (0.005)    
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of Country-Years 3,048 2,700 3,048 2,700 2,676 2,435 2,676 2,435 
Number of Countries 110 105 110 105 99 97 99 97 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
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Table 2: The Effect of State Capacity on Turnover and Democratic Change 
 Models Testing H4 Models Testing H5 Treatment Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Incumbent Turnover 
Incumbent 
Turnover 
Democratic 
Change  
Democratic 
Change  Democratic Change 
      
State Capacity   -0.007 -0.013    0.020*   
   (0.012) (0.012)    (0.009)    
Turnover in election?   0.004 0.005 0.128*** 
   (0.009) (0.010) (0.016)    
State Capacity x    0.008 0.015  
Turnover   (0.012) (0.012)  
      
     Incumbent turnover 
State Capacity (t-1) -0.677** -0.862**    -0.331*   
 (0.256) (0.327)      (0.135)    
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes 
Number of Elections 397 383 384  371  365 
Number of Countries 98 94 98 96 94 
Models 1 and 2 are based on time-series-cross-sectional logistic regression with regional fixed effects, model 3 and 4 
are based on time-series cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression with country fixed effects. Model 5 are 
based on treatment model ordinary least squares regression (i.e. linear regression with endogenous treatment effects, 
with maximum likelihood estimates). Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
 
As models 1 and 2 show, state capacity (measured in the year before the election) has a 
strong effect on incumbent turnover. If we plot the predicted values of turnover by the different 
levels of state capacity that are present in our sample in Figure 2, it becomes clear that at low 
levels of state capacity, turnover is much more likely to occur, and that the probability of 
turnover declines as state capacity increases. These results suggest that state capacity is an 
important factor shaping whether authoritarian elections result in turnover.  
 
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Turnover by State Capacity 
 
95% confidence intervals, estimates based on model 2, Table 2.  
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Furthermore, models 3 and 4 seem to support H5: the main effect for state capacity 
indicates the effect of state capacity when elections did not result in incumbent turnover: which 
is negative in both models. Conversely, the effect of state capacity when elections did result in 
turnover is indicated by adding the coefficient for the interaction effect to the main effect for 
state capacity (-0.013+0.015), resulting in a net positive effect of state capacity on democratic 
change. Yet, these coefficients are not significant.22 A treatment model as presented in model 5 is 
a more appropriate test for our hypothesis about the two-stage nature of democratization-by-
elections, where elections first need to lead to incumbent turnover in order to open possibilities 
for wider post-election democratic change. In model 5 we model turnover and democratic 
change as such a two-stage process using a treatment model. The results of the selection model, 
i.e. predicting turnover, indicate the expected strong negative effect of state capacity on turnover, 
though the strength of the effect is somewhat diminished in comparison to models 1 and 2. The 
results of the regression model indicate that turnover has a strong positive effect on democratic 
change in years after elections. Moreover, once turnover is taken into account, state capacity has 
a positive effect on democratic change in electoral authoritarian regimes. The effect is not very 
large substantively, but significant and robust to alternative model specifications. Hence, the 
results in table 2 appear to confirm our hypotheses 4 and 5: state capacity negatively affects 
turnover in authoritarian elections, yet strengthens post-election democratic change if elections 
resulted in turnover.  
As robustness checks of the results presented here, analyses were carried out using 
different criteria for sample selection, using different measures for the dependent variables, and 
using a different measure for state capacity. The results of these tests are reported in the 
Appendix to this paper. In brief, hypothesis 1 is confirmed in all models: holding elections leads 
to democratic change even in authoritarian regimes, as democratic change in years after elections 
is significantly higher than in years when no elections were held.23 In addition, hypothesis 3 also 
appears to be robust to alternative model specifications: state capacity significantly lowers the 
likelihood of democratic change, regardless of whether elections were held or not. Only in 
models using the Polity IV < 0 score as sample selection criterion and in models with the 
alternative measure of state capacity was the effect of state capacity insignificant, though still 
negative. The effect of turnover on democratic change appeared not to be very robust in the 
models considering all country-years (i.e. results presented in Table 1), which might be due to the 																																																								
22 Note that the results remain substantively the same if we include lagged state capacity in models 3 to 5. Results are 
available upon request from the authors. 
23 When using the alternative measure of state capacity the positive effect of elections is limited to elections that 
experienced turnover. 
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fact that elections with turnover represent only a very small subset of the sample when 
considering country-years. When democratic change after elections is considered (i.e. results 
presented in Table 2), turnover in elections has a consistent positive effect on post-election 
democratic change, providing support for hypothesis 2. Finally, hypotheses 4 and 5 about the 
conditional effect of state capacity on the democratizing power of elections appear to be partially 
confirmed by the empirical analyses. There is a clear negative effect of state capacity on turnover 
in elections, and this effect is robust to alternative model specifications, confirming hypothesis 4. 
Yet, the positive effect of state capacity on democratic change after elections resulted in turnover 
is not always confirmed in robustness checks. Moreover, the positive effects of state capacity on 
democratic change are substantively small, compared to the effects of for example turnover on 
democratic change. 
 
Conclusion 
Under what conditions do elections lead to democratization or conversely, sustain 
authoritarianism? Using new data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, the 
empirical analyses in this paper tested the effects of elections and state capacity on democratic 
change. The results suggest that both elections and state capacity have direct effects on 
democratic change in authoritarian regimes, with elections enhancing democratic change and 
state capacity undermining democratic change. 
When it comes to the conditioning effect of state capacity on the democratizing power 
of elections, these effects were modeled as a two-stage process, first examining the effect of state 
capacity on turnover in elections, and then evaluating the effect of state capacity on democratic 
change once turnover had occurred. The results indicate that the negative effect of state capacity 
on turnover is much larger than the positive effect of state capacity on democratic change once 
turnover occurred, suggesting that the net effect of state capacity on the democratizing power of 
elections may be negative. Hence, while state capacity could be helpful for sustaining democratic 
change after elections resulted in turnover, the negative direct effect of state capacity on 
democratic change as well as negative effect on the likelihood of elections resulting in turnover, 
suggests that the empirical evidence for net negative effects of state capacity is stronger in 
authoritarian elections. 
Moreover, the positive effect of turnover on post-election democratic change is 
substantial. This suggests that in weak states turnover in elections is more likely, and if turnover 
occurs positive democratic change is more likely too. Democratic change will probably be 
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hampered somewhat by weak state capacity, but since the effect of state capacity on post-
election democratic change is comparatively weak, this might be less of a concern than scholars 
emphasizing the strong-state first approach to democratization have suggested (Fukuyama, 2005, 
2014). 
A number of caveats are in place however. In the analyses presented here we have 
analyzed democratization-by-elections taking a relatively short-term perspective, by considering 
short-term causal effects such as the regime losing elections and democratic change in the years 
immediately following elections. There were good methodological reasons for doing so, as taking 
a larger time period after elections in which to measure democratic change would lead the next 
elections to be included in the period over which democratic change was measured, potentially 
confounding cause and effect. However, democratization-by-elections may also work through 
more long-term causal mechanisms, i.e. processes of ‘creeping democratisation’ whereby 
successive elections generate slow protracted change in other partial regimes of democracy that 
eventually prepare the ground for broader democratic change. Better understanding of the role 
of state capacity in promoting or hampering such processes would be an interesting venue for 
future research.  
This leads to the second caveat, which is that we have considered democratic change 
here as shifts of regimes in the direction of democracy, conceiving of regimes to be located along 
a continuum from very authoritarian to very democratic, and counting positive democratic 
change as an indication that democratization-by-elections was successful. Yet, some would argue 
that successful democratic change is only achieved when democratic change is substantial 
enough to shift regimes from electoral authoritarianism into becoming electoral democracies. 
Future research exploring how elections and state capacity interact in generating regime change 
between different regime types could give a more complete picture of the role of elections and 
state capacity in generating democratization.  
Finally, an interesting venue for future research would be to investigate the specific 
causal mechanisms by which state capacity affects the democratizing power of elections, for 
example by disaggregating state capacity into its three components of administrative, coercive 
and extractive capacity. Currently, comparative data on state capacity is scarce, and data on its 
specific components even more so, limiting analyses to a very small (and non-random) sub-set of 
electoral authoritarian regimes for which such data are available. Even at the aggregate level, the 
limited convergence between different measures of state capacity calls into question the quality 
of existing comparative data on state capacity. The new Hanson and Sigman (2013) data 
ameliorates this situation by using multiple data sources and Bayesian latent variable analysis to 
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generate high quality comparative data on state capacity, but more detailed data on components 
of state capacity are still lacking. Future research collecting large N comparative data on these 
dimensions would be highly valuable, and could shed more light into the causal mechanisms 
connecting state capacity, elections and democratic change.     
However, recognizing these caveats, the findings presented in this paper have important 
implications. Our findings suggest that the positive effects of state capacity for democratization 
may have been over estimated, and suggest that strengthening state capacity in authoritarian 
regimes is not necessarily good for democratization. Of course, strengthening state capacity 
might be good to achieve other goals such as efficient public service delivery, but the empirical 
evidence presented here suggests that the net effect of state capacity is negative, casting doubt on 
the relevance of strong-state-first theories for democratization in contemporary electoral 
authoritarian regimes.  
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Maravall, José María and Ignatio Sánchez-Cuenca (eds.) (2008) Controlling Governments: Voters, 
Institutions, and Accountability. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Schedler, Andreas (2002) The Menu of Manipulation Journal of Democracy 13(2): 36-50. 
Schedler, Andreas (2013) The Politics of Uncertainty. Sustaining and Subverting Electoral 
Authoritarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Seeberg, Merete B. (2014) State capacity and the paradox of authoritarian elections, 
Democratization 21(7): 1265-1285.  
Guo, Shenyang and Mark W. Fraser. 2015. Propensity Score Analysis – Statistical Methods and 
Applications, 2nd edition, Sage Publishing. 
Sikkink, Kathryn (1991) Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
Slater, Dan (2012) Strong-State Democratization in Malaysia and Singapore. Journal of Democracy 
23(2): 19–33. 
Slater, Dan and Sofia Fenner (2011) State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms 
	 22	
and Authoritarian Durability. Journal of International Affairs 65(1): 15–29. 
Teorell, Jan (2010) Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Felix Hartmann & Richard 
Svensson (2015) The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan15. University of 
Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.  
van Ham, Carolien and Staffan Lindberg (2015) From Sticks to Carrots: Electoral Manipulation 
in Africa, 1986–2012. Government and Opposition 50(3): 521-548.  
Way, Lucan (2005) Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in 
the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. World Politics 57(2): 
231–261. 
Weber, Max (1918) Politics as a Vocation. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by Hans 
H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. 1946 [1919] New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–128.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 23	
Appendix 
Table A. Summary statistics analyses Table 1 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Democratic change in 2 years after elections 3,056 0.01 0.07 -0.37 0.65 
Executive election held? 3,056 0.15 0.35 0 1 
State capacity 2,679 -0.37 0.68 -2.48 1.53 
Level of democracy (t-1) 3,048 0.22 0.14 0.02 0.70 
Turnover  3,056 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Coup (t-1) 3,050 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Civil war (t-1) 3,050 0.10 0.30 0 1 
GDP per capita growth (% annual) (t-1) 2,733 1.24 6.63 -62.21 91.67 
GDP per capita (current USD) (t-1) 2,796 1364.55 1710.92 64.81 14231.60 
 
 
Table B. Summary statistics analyses Table 2 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Democratic change in 2 years after elections 445 0.02 0.09 -0.26 0.64 
Turnover  445 0.34 0.48 0 1 
State capacity  385 -0.33 0.70 -2.34 1.35 
State capacity (t-1) 397 -0.36 0.72 -2.42 1.53 
Level of democracy (t-1) 444 0.26 0.13 0.02 0.56 
Coup (t-1) 444 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Civil war (t-1) 444 0.07 0.26 0 1 
GDP per capita growth (% annual) (t-1) 425 1.10 6.72 -62.21 23.64 
GDP per capita (current USD) (t-1) 432 1537.87 1727.44 72.53 13323.88 
Presidential system  445 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Ethnic fractionalisation  426 0.52 0.25 0 0.93 
Religious fractionalisation 429 0.43 0.25 0 0.86 
Former British colony 442 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Region 445 3.72 1.92 1 7 
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A. Results with alternative sample selection criteria for electoral authoritarian regime 
 
Table 1A. The Effect of Elections and State Capacity on Democratic Change 
 Combined models - original 
Combined models – Schedler 
(2002) sample selection 
Combined models – 
Polity IV < 0 
Combined models – All 
national elections included 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VARIABLES Democratic change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
         Executive election held? 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.030** 0.028* 0.034** 0.032* 0.035*** 0.033*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) Level of democracy (t-1) -0.147*** -0.190*** -0.169*** -0.210*** -0.105*** -0.148*** -0.139*** -0.180*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.032) (0.036) (0.013) (0.015) Election x Democracy -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.097* -0.106* -0.122* -0.129* -0.102*** -0.105*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.048) (0.051) (0.059) (0.062) (0.022) (0.024) Turnover in election? 0.012 0.012+ -0.002 0.002 0.015 0.016 0.015* 0.016* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) State Capacity -0.011** -0.012** -0.015** -0.014** -0.004 -0.001 -0.010** -0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) State Capacity x Election 0.014** 0.011* 0.004 0.001 0.012 0.006 0.013** 0.008+ 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of Country-Years 2,676 2,435 1,812 1,608 1,468 1,263 2,910 2,597 
Number of Countries 99 97 92 90 81 78 110 109 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
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Table 2A. The Effect of State Capacity on Turnover and Democratic Change 
 Treatment model - Original Treatment model - Schedler (2002) sample selection 
Treatment model - All national 
elections included 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Democratic change Democratic change Democratic change 
    
State Capacity 0.020* 0.021+ 0.015* 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) 
Turnover in election? 0.128*** 0.132*** 0.125*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) 
    
 Incumbent turnover Incumbent turnover Incumbent turnover 
State Capacity (t-1) -0.331* -0.479** -0.231* 
 (0.135) (0.172) (0.115) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Elections 365 191 543 
Number of Countries 94 78 98 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001.  
Note that treatment models using the sample of Polity IV < 0 did not converge and hence are not reported here.  
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B. Results with alternative dependent variables 
 
Table 1B. The Effect of Elections and State Capacity on Democratic Change 
 Combined models – original 
Combined models – 
democratic change in 3 years 
after elections 
Combined models –
democratic change polyarchy 
index 
Combined models – turnover 
head of government 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VARIABLES Democratic change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
         Executive election held? 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.027** 0.041*** 0.037** 0.042*** 0.038*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) Level of democracy (t-1) -0.147*** -0.190*** -0.223*** -0.288*** -0.215*** -0.271*** -0.146*** -0.189*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.013) (0.015) Election x Democracy -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.082* -0.072* -0.114** -0.111** -0.123*** -0.120*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.039) (0.027) (0.028) Turnover in election? 0.012 0.012+ 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.022** 0.023** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) State Capacity -0.011** -0.012** -0.012* -0.013* -0.014* -0.013* -0.011** -0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) State Capacity x Election 0.014** 0.011* 0.018** 0.014* 0.008 0.003 0.014** 0.010+ 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of Country-Years 2,676 2,435 2,676 2,435 2,676 2,435 2,676 2,435 
Number of Countries 99 97 99 97 99 97 99 97 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
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Table 2B. The Effect of State Capacity on Turnover and Democratic Change 
 Treatment model - Original Treatment model - democratic change in 3 years after elections 
Treatment model - democratic 
change polyarchy index 
Treatment model - turnover head 
of government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Democratic change Democratic change Democratic change Democratic change 
     
State Capacity 0.020* 0.028** 0.015 0.017+   
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)    
Turnover in election? 0.128*** 0.146*** 0.110*** 0.119*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.031) (0.020)    
     
 Incumbent turnover Incumbent turnover Incumbent turnover Incumbent turnover 
State Capacity (t-1) -0.331* -0.316* -0.377* -0.346*   
 (0.135) (0.131) (0.147) (0.146)    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Elections 365 365 365 365 
Number of Countries 94 94 94 94 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
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C. Results with alternative independent variable for state capacity 
 
Table 1C. The Effect of Elections and State Capacity on Democratic Change 
 Combined models – original  
Combined models – state 
authority over territory (Vdem) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Democratic change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
Democratic 
change 
     
Executive election held? 0.043*** 0.039*** -0.032 -0.027 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.030) (0.032) 
Level of democracy (t-1) -0.147*** -0.190*** -0.145*** -0.185*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) 
Election x Democracy -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.129*** -0.120*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) 
Turnover in election? 0.012 0.012+ 0.013+ 0.013+ 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
State Capacity -0.011** -0.012** -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
State Capacity x Election 0.014** 0.011* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Number of Country-Years 2,676 2,435 3,048 2,700 
Number of Countries 99 97 110 105 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
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Table 2C. The Effect of State Capacity on Turnover and Democratic Change 
 Treatment model - Original Treatment model - state authority over territory (Vdem) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Democratic change Democratic change 
   
State Capacity 0.020* 0.002** 
 (0.009) (0.001) 
Turnover in election? 0.128*** 0.143*** 
 (0.016) (0.040) 
   
 Incumbent turnover Incumbent turnover 
State Capacity (t-1) -0.331* -0.030*** 
 (0.135) (0.007) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Number of Elections 365 410 
Number of Countries 94 100 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001.  
Models are estimated using two-step consistent estimates.  
